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Abstract 
We study regulatory enforcement actions issued against US banks to show that both board 
monitoring and advising are effective in preventing misconduct by banks. While better 
monitoring by boards prevents all categories of misconduct, better advising prevents misconduct 
of a technical nature. Board monitoring increases the likelihood that misconduct is detected, 
increases the penalties imposed on the CEO and alleviates shareholder wealth losses following 
the detection of misconduct by regulators. Our paper offers novel insights on how to structure 
bank boards to prevent bank misconduct.  
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1. Introduction 
The reputation of banks for professional and ethical conduct is in sharp decline. Over recent 
years, regulators have taken record numbers of enforcement actions against banks to require 
them to take corrective measures against misconduct. Among the banks engulfed in misconduct 
cases are various high-profile institutions. For instance, JPMorgan has faced several enforcement 
actions related to credit card fraud, money laundering and internal accounting controls over the 
past few years.1 Misconduct cases are costly to bank investors with the fines imposed often 
outweighed by substantial reputational losses for offending banks. There are also concerns that 
repeated instances of misconduct erode public confidence in the safety and soundness of the 
banking sector. What banks can do to prevent misconduct is therefore an important question. 
Arguably, a bank’s board of directors, in its capacity to monitor and advise the CEO (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007; Fama and Jensen, 1983), should play a key role in the implementation and 
oversight of controls to mitigate the risk of misconduct.2 The purpose of this paper is to test this 
assertion. Specifically, we examine whether the two key functions of bank boards, monitoring 
and advising, are effective in preventing misconduct by banks. We use regulatory enforcement 
actions against banks to identify banks that engage in misconduct.  
In some ways, the recent surge in bank misconduct cases is surprising. One explanation 
for misconduct holds that when a CEO has too much authority within the firm, misconduct is but 
                                                          
1 “OCC to hit JPMorgan Chase With Enforcement Actions”, Dow Jones, 14 January 2013. 
2 Regulators increasingly see boards as key to shaping a bank’s risk culture with a view to preventing misconduct. 
Recent regulatory guidelines issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (2014) establish ‘heighted 
expectations’ of the role of the board in ensuring that banks operate in a safe and sound manner. Similar 
expectations of the role of bank boards are expressed by the Financial Stability Board (2014). 
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one potential outcome (Khanna et al., 2015). However, by most accounts, oversight of CEO 
decision-making has improved markedly in recent years. Data from Riskmetrics show that eight 
out of ten members of US bank boards are classified as independent in 2012, up from around half 
in 2000. With increasing levels of independence, one would expect bank boards to be more 
effective in preventing misconduct. However, far from a declining trend, the number of 
enforcement actions has increased from 5 to 28 over the same time period.   
The rise in bank misconduct cases under increasingly more independent boards is 
consistent with the view that true board independence is difficult to achieve (e.g., Coles et al., 
2014; Lee et al., 2014). Board independence can be undermined if CEOs exert intangible 
influence over those charged with monitoring them. One way in which a CEO could yield 
intangible influence is by capturing the board through director appointments (Khanna et al., 
2015). Since the CEO is typically involved in the process of recommending directors to the 
board, directors appointed during the tenure of the current CEO have an incentive to return the 
favor (Coles et al., 2014; Khanna et al., 2015). Even independent directors may reciprocate the 
CEO’s requests and agree to side with the CEO to support, engage in or conceal wrongdoing. 
Following this line of argument, only directors appointed before the current CEO’s tenure are 
free from this type of intangible influence and are therefore capable of objectively monitoring the 
CEO. In this paper, we measure the quality of board monitoring using the fraction of directors 
who are appointed before the current CEO takes office (Monitoring Quality).   
In addition to monitoring, boards also advise the CEO. Advice is critical because CEOs 
may not always possess the knowledge and skills required to make decisions that lower instances 
of wrongdoing. Since the banking sector is complex and skill-intensive (Philippon and Reshef, 
2012), bank CEOs may be prone to missteps in the absence of technical expertise. Therefore, 
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boards with the capability to advise effectively could assist CEOs in making better decisions and 
thus play a crucial role in reducing instances of bank misconduct. We proxy for the quality of 
board advice using the connections that a director has with directors at other firms at any given 
time (Advising Quality). We focus on director connections because connections arise when a 
director has qualities that make them valuable to many firms (Coles et al., 2012). Demand for 
director services arises from a director’s ability to provide useful advice, information or contacts. 
Furthermore, connected directors have better access to information which would allow them to 
offer higher-quality advice to the CEO.  
To identify bank misconduct, we employ a unique dataset of regulatory enforcement 
actions issued by the three US supervisory bodies (the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC)) against banks that engage in unsafe, unsound and illegal banking practices which violate 
laws. One concern with our analysis is that we can only observe detected misconduct (once an 
enforcement action has been issued), but not the population of all committed cases of 
misconduct. That is, even in the absence of enforcement actions, a bank may still have engaged 
in undetected misconduct. To address this problem of partial observability, we follow Wang 
(2013) and Wang et al. (2010) to employ a bivariate probit model that disentangles committing 
misconduct from the detection of misconduct conditional upon misconduct having occurred.  
We find that a bank in which Monitoring Quality is high (all directors have been 
appointed before the CEO takes office) has a 27% lower probability of committing misconduct 
and a 35% higher probability of detection (conditional upon misconduct having occurred) than a 
bank where all directors have been appointed under the current CEO. Further, a one-standard-
deviation increase in Advising Quality reduces the likelihood that misconduct is committed by 
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11% and increases the likelihood of detection by 7%. Our results are robust to two-stage 
instrumental variable (IV) analysis that circumvents endogeneity concerns by exploiting the role 
of the local labor market in supplying directors to a bank. Specifically, we use the distance from 
a bank’s headquarters to the nearest airport and the population of the county where a bank is 
headquartered as sources of exogenous variation in our measures of board monitoring and 
advice. In brief, we argue that banks in remote locations will see higher director turnover and 
struggle to recruit directors of high advising capability. Further, in all specifications, we control 
for the proportion of independent directors and the number of directors with financial expertise. 
We find that these traditional measures of board monitoring and advising have little or no power 
to prevent bank misconduct. 
We are able to rule out alternative economic interpretations of our results. First, one may 
argue that our measure of board monitoring quality captures the effect of CEO tenure. We 
address this by constructing Residual Monitoring Quality as the residual from a regression of 
Monitoring Quality on CEO tenure. Our results continue to hold when using residual monitoring, 
which removes any correlation between Monitoring Quality and CEO tenure. Second, our 
monitoring measure may capture director experience as longer-tenured directors are less likely to 
have been appointed by the current CEO. As with CEO tenure, we construct Residual 
Monitoring Quality as the residual from a regression of Monitoring Quality on average board 
tenure. Our results remain robust to using this alternative measure of monitoring quality. Third, 
our monitoring measure is robust to controlling for director’s career concerns (Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1992), board busyness (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) and for the quality of board 
advising. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our measure of board advising quality is distinct 
from monitoring quality, as demonstrated at various points throughout this study.  
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How do board monitoring and advising prevent bank misconduct? We study two 
channels that help explain the results. First, many enforcement actions are issued when bank 
fundamentals indicate increased bank risk. Our results show that better monitoring and advising 
prevent enforcement actions because these boards are associated with higher bank capital 
cushions, lower portfolio risk and fewer non-performing loans. Second, CEOs will be deterred 
from committing wrongdoing if they know ex ante that a board will penalize them for instances 
of misconduct. We find that boards that are not captured by the CEO are more willing to impose 
heavier penalties on the CEO following detected misconduct. That is, after misconduct is 
detected, better Monitoring Quality is associated with a larger reduction in (i) the level of CEO 
pay, (ii) the level of CEO pay relative to the other top executives at the same bank (the CEO pay 
slice), and (iii) the value of CEO risk-taking incentives.3 In contrast, Advising Quality does not 
affect CEO discipline, consistent with our argument that Advising Quality is distinct from and 
unrelated to Monitoring Quality.  
Finally, we examine whether the stock market reaction to bank misconduct is affected by 
our measures of board quality. We find a positive relation between the announcement returns and 
board quality, implying that effective boards are associated with less severe fraud. Thus, 
effective boards not only reduce the likelihood of wrongdoing, but they also alleviate shareholder 
wealth losses upon announcements of wrongdoing.  
This paper makes several important contributions. First, our work is related to the debate 
on governance and risk-taking in the banking industry (Adams and Ragunathan, 2013; Beltratti 
and Stulz, 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Minton et al., 2014). We contribute to this literature 
                                                          
3 The finding of a reduced CEO pay slice is of particular significance because it indicates that, by disciplining CEOs 
relative to other bank executives, boards hold CEOs at least in part responsible for misconduct. 
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by providing the first empirical work that studies the effectiveness of bank boards in preventing 
enforcement actions in the banking sector. Relative to other bank risk measures studied in the 
literature, enforcement actions provide a suitable identification of the effectiveness of internal 
governance. This is because enforcement actions provide an unambiguous external indicator of 
undesirable conduct in the industry. Further, since regulators determine enforcement, the degree 
of enforcement varies exogenously across banks. Additionally, our empirical approach allows us 
to elicit the specific mechanisms through which corporate governance affects misconduct 
tendency in banking.   
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on the determinants and economics of 
corporate misconduct. Previous work has linked misconduct to a lack of monitoring by the board 
(Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Beasley, 1996; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Hegde and Zhou, 2014; 
Khanna et al., 2015), outside investors (Wang et al., 2010) or various other parties (Dyck et al., 
2010; Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). We contribute to this literature by identifying the role of 
advising in explaining misconduct. We find that while monitoring is required to deter all sorts of 
misconduct, advising plays a clear role in preventing misconduct of a more technical nature.   
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the role and design of corporate boards (e.g., 
Adams et al., 2010; Coles et al., 2012, 2014; Field et al., 2013; Minton et al., 2014). The key 
question in this literature is whether boards matter for firm outcomes, and if they do, which 
particular board functions matter. We present the first empirical study that simultaneously 
considers the effects of board monitoring and advising. Our results on how board monitoring and 
advising jointly and differentially affect misconduct are new to the literature.  
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2.   Research Design 
2.1 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Fama and Jensen (1983) and Adams and Ferreira (2007) posit that directors monitor and advise 
the CEO to help align the interests between managers and shareholders and to maximize 
shareholder value. Since corporate misconduct can potentially destroy shareholder value on a 
large scale (Karpoff et al., 2008a), we conjecture that an effective board of directors, in its 
capacity to monitor and advise the CEO, should also play a key role in mitigating the risk of 
misconduct.  
 
2.1.1 Board monitoring quality and bank misconduct 
It is well-established that in the absence of tight monitoring from the board, CEOs may have 
incentives to commit wrongdoing to conceal private benefits (Dechow et al., 2010; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Stein, 1989). Such benefits could involve higher compensation or non-financial 
benefits such as greater publicity or empire building. Thus, a board of directors that is 
independent from the CEO is needed to monitor and discipline the CEO to curb managerial 
misbehavior (e.g., Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Beasley, 1996).   
We hypothesize that boards that are not psychologically captured by the CEO are more 
willing to monitor the CEO and that this will prevent misconduct. Our hypothesis is grounded in 
social influence theory, which posits that individuals rely on principles of reciprocity, a nearly 
universal code of moral conduct, when making decisions (Gouldner, 1960). The theory suggests 
that most people exhibit a psychological aversion to over-benefiting or under-benefiting from 
social relationships (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). This implies that when employees believe they 
receive help in their appointments to a position of corporate influence, they will be motivated to 
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return the favor to avoid the psychological distress created by over-benefiting from a 
relationship. 
As the CEO is typically involved in appointing and recommending directors to the board, 
directors appointed by the CEO tend to feel indebted to her and thus have a natural tendency to 
return the favor (Coles et al., 2014; Khanna et al., 2015; Landier et al., 2013). Consistent with 
this, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) specify in their model of CEO bargaining with the board 
that directors develop a natural aversion to monitoring because the opportunity cost of director’s 
time can be high. Consequently, the reciprocity fostered through appointment decisions helps 
directors to justify their aversion to monitoring (see also, e.g. Coles et al., 2014). This creates an 
environment conducive to misconduct, makes detection of misconduct difficult and reduces a 
CEO’s expected costs of committing misconduct. We therefore predict that directors appointed 
before the current CEO are psychologically independent and in a position to objectively monitor 
the CEO in a way that prevents wrongdoing. We call the fraction of board directors appointed 
before the current CEO Monitoring Quality. We hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1: Monitoring Quality reduces the likelihood of bank misconduct.  
 
2.1.2 Board advising quality and bank misconduct  
Our second hypothesis relates board advising to bank misconduct. While early studies suggest 
that boards monitor and give advice to the CEO (e.g., Mace, 1971), the focus of much 
subsequent study has been on the monitoring role of the board (see Coles et al., 2014; Hermalin 
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and Weisbach, 1998; Weisbach, 1988).4 While Coles et al. (2012) offer one of the first studies 
into the value of board advice by showing that complex firms benefit from greater advice, more 
recent studies emphasize the role of board advice for firms with minimal experience in public 
markets (Field et al., 2013) and firms operating in innovative industries (Dass et al., 2014).  
 We hypothesize that better board advice prevents corporate misconduct. This is because 
some CEOs may lack the expertise to make certain informed decisions and misconduct cases 
may occur when CEOs are unaware of the (il)legality of a certain activity (Khanna et al., 2015). 
In banks, some CEOs may lack the technical expertise to effectively oversee regulatory 
provisioning and reserve requirements—and breaches of either could result in regulatory 
enforcement actions. We, therefore, argue that a board with a higher capability to give advice to 
the CEO will facilitate more informed decision-making and prevent incidences of misconduct. 
We use director connections as an indicator of board advising. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
suggest that connections signal director quality because in a competitive labor market only high-
quality directors hold multiple board appointments. Brickley et al. (1998), Fich and Shivdasani 
(2007), Kaplan and Reishus (1990) and others show that high quality directors serve on a greater 
number of boards. In addition, better-connected directors are likely to have had experience with a 
variety of issues that firms face and can lever their network to access better information (e.g., 
Cohen et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2012; Field et al., 2013). Hence, better-connected directors 
should be better advisors to the CEO and provide the information, perspectives, and technical 
expertise to the CEO to help avoid wrongdoing. We define Advising Quality as the total number 
                                                          
4 Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) acknowledge that “one limitation of our model is that it focuses solely on the 
monitoring role of boards. The institutional literature emphasizes that boards also play important roles providing 
information and advice to management” (p. 112). 
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of directors to whom board members on the board are collectively connected, scaled by board 
size. We hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2: Advising Quality reduces the likelihood of bank misconduct 
 
2.2 SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION 
We gather data on regulatory enforcement actions issued by the three main US banking 
supervisory authorities (FDIC, FRB and OCC) for the period 2000–2013 from SNL Financial.5 
Our sample encompasses all severe enforcement actions, including (1) Formal agreements, (2) 
Cease and desist orders and (3) Prompt corrective actions.6  
In the next step, we obtain all banks with accounting data from commercial bank and 
bank holding company data (FFIEC 031/041 and FR Y-9C). To allow for a lag structure in our 
dataset, our sample period is from 1999 to 2012. We then obtain market data from the Center for 
                                                          
5 Enforcement is a key tool that regulators use to ensure that banks maintain safe and sound practices (Delis and 
Staikouras, 2011). Typically, regulators conduct on-site examinations to ensure that bank operations are consistent 
with sound banking practices. When on-site examinations reveal unsound or illegal banking practices, regulators 
will make an informal enquiry to the bank management. This gives the bank the opportunity to justify their 
practices. The regulator will only issue an enforcement action when there is substantial evidence of misconduct. 
Therefore, one advantage of using regulatory enforcement actions to identify banks that engage in misconduct is that 
there is a very low chance of misdetection and thus a low chance of misidentifying banks engaged in misconduct.   
6 Formal (written) agreements are agreements between the bank and the regulator that set out details on how to 
correct conditions that provide the basis for the agreement. Cease and desist orders prohibit the bank from engaging 
in certain banking activities. They also require the bank to take corrective actions to improve on areas that provide 
the basis for the order. Prompt corrective actions are imposed on undercapitalized banks. They require the bank to 
restore adequate levels of capital and demand submission of a capital restoration plan within a predetermined period.  
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Research in Securities Price (CRSP) and corporate governance data from the BoardEx database 
and match them with our Call Reports sample.  
We then match the name, city and state of each bank that received enforcement actions to 
our panel dataset. This results in a matched sample of 311 enforcement actions. We then use 
Factiva to search for newspaper articles reporting the news of the enforcement action and screen 
each to ensure that we have correctly attributed the enforcement action to a particular bank. If 
there are multiple enforcement actions relating to a single case of misconduct, we group them 
together so that only one case is identified. Our final sample contains 4,072 bank-year 
observations of 533 unique banks and 244 enforcement actions.  
 [Table I around here]  
Table I provides descriptive statistics on the enforcement action sample. It shows that 
enforcement actions were taken against banks in every year with a surge following the 2007 
global financial crisis. We demonstrate in the Internet Appendix that the results we report are not 
dependent on the time period analyzed in this paper and equally hold before 2007. Table I also 
shows that our sample is very comprehensive. The sample contains nearly 80% of all 
enforcement actions (nearly 95% by bank size) issued against listed US banks during our 
sampling period. 
  
2.3 EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
Empirical research on corporate misconduct faces an inherent challenge, namely that 
misconduct is not observed until it has been detected. This means the outcome we observe is the 
product of two processes: the commission of misconduct and the detection of misconduct. As 
long as detection is not perfect, we do not observe every instance of misconduct that has been 
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committed. To address this partial observability problem, we follow Wang (2013) and Wang et 
al. (2010) and use the bivariate probit model. The theoretical foundation of this model is drawn 
from Becker’s (1968) economic approach to crime. It can be implied from the model that an 
individual’s probability of committing fraud increases with the expected payoffs and decreases 
with its expected cost (from getting detected and penalized). Thus, the probability committing 
misconduct is determined by two sets of variables. The first set is derived from the expected 
benefit of committing fraud. The second set of variables is related to the expected cost of 
committing fraud, which essentially depends on the probability of detection. 
In addition, there are factors that are related to both the probability to commit misconduct 
and to detect misconduct, for example, a board of directors that is not willing to monitor the 
CEO, and therefore should be included in both equations. However, there are factors that affect 
the likelihood that misconduct is detected but not a bank’s incentives to commit wrongdoing. 
Likewise, there are factors that incentivize misconduct but do not affect the likelihood that 
misconduct is detected. The bivariate probit model relies on this intuition to separate fraud 
detection from commission processes. Let Mit and Dit represent whether bank i commits 
wrongdoing in year t and whether the misconduct is detected, respectively:   
       Mit* = XM, it M + it                 (1) 
Dit* = XD, it D + it           (2) 
XM, it is a vector of variables that explain firm i’s incentives to commit misconduct in year t, 
and XD, it is a vector of variables that explain firm i’s likelihood of getting caught. it and it are 
zero-mean disturbances with a bivariate normal distribution.  
We denote Mit = 1 if Mit* > 0 and Mit = 0 otherwise. We denote Dit = 1 if Dit* > 0, and Dit 
= 0 otherwise. We do not directly observe the realizations of Mit and Dit. However, we can 
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observe the following: Zit = Mit  Dit where Zit = 1 if bank i engages in misconduct and this is 
detected, and Zit = 0 if bank i does not commit wrongdoing or commits wrongdoing but this has 
not been detected.  
 
Let  denote the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function.  is the correlation 
between it and it from (1) and (2). Then:  
P(Zit = 1) = P(Mit Dit  = 1) = P(Mit = 1, Dit = 1)= (XM, it M , XD, it D, ),          (3) 
P(Zit = 0) = P(Mit Dit  = 0) = P(Mit = 0, Dit = 0) + P(Mit = 1, Dit = 0)        
= 1- (XM, it M, XD, it D,)               (4) 
 
Thus, the log likelihood for the model is:  
L(M, D, ) =  log(P(Zit = 1)) +  log(P(Zit = 0))            (5) 
 
The bivariate model can be estimated using the maximum-likelihood method. According 
to Poirier (1980), an important feature of this approach is that XM,it and XD,it do not contain the 
same set of variables such that there is at least one vector that has one or more variables absent in 
the other vector (see also Wang (2013), Wang et al. (2010)). We detail the variables included in 
both vectors in Section 2.4.2.      
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2.4 VARIABLES  
2.4.1 Board quality: monitoring and advising  
Monitoring Quality. We capture board monitoring quality using the number of board 
members appointed before the current CEO takes office. We refer to such members as “non-
captured” board members.7 We define the variable as:   
 
1
#



sizeBoard
membersboardcapturednon
QualityMonitoring
                           (6)
 
 
The denominator is the total number of directors sitting on the board less the CEO as she 
always sits on the board in our sample. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values 
indicating a board that is not captured by the CEO and thus is more willing to independently 
monitor the CEO. The average Monitoring Quality in our sample is 0.54. Thus, in our sample, 
half of the board is not captured by the CEO. We use BoardEx to construct Monitoring Quality. 
BoardEx provides biographic data of more than 60,000 unique directors serving at over 70,000 
private, public and not-for-profit companies.  
For robustness, we also construct the alternative measure Residual Monitoring Quality, 
which is defined as the residual from a regression of Monitoring Quality on CEO tenure. This 
variable will remove the positive correlation between CEO tenure and Monitoring Quality. Thus, 
it isolates the board monitoring effect from the effect of CEO tenure.  
                                                          
7 To construct this variable, we compare the start of the employment date of the board member and date the CEO 
takes office. When the CEO leaves and then gets re-appointed, we do not reset tenure to zero but add on the pre-
departure tenure. 
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Advising Quality. We use the number of directors to whom existing board members of a 
given bank are connected to proxy for the ability of the board to advise the CEO. Following 
Coles et al. (2012), we define the variable as:  
 
sizeBoard
connectedaremembersboardmwhotodirectors
QualityngAdvisi
#

   (7)
 
 
For each board member of a given bank, we count the number of directors in other firms 
that this member is connected to by serving as co-directors. We then sum across all board 
members of this bank and then divide this sum by the size of the board to obtain Advising 
Quality. The average Advising Quality in our sample is 1.81. The correlation between 
Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality is 0.01 confirming that the two are distinct measures 
that proxy for different board functions.8   
 
                                                          
8 However, one could still argue that Advising Quality captures other aspects of board monitoring that are unrelated 
to Monitoring Quality. To completely rule out this possibility, we examine the effects of Advising Quality on CEO 
turnover and CEO compensation policies, which are part of a board’s monitoring activities. We find that Advising 
Quality does not have any measurable effect on (i) CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, (ii) the level of CEO pay, 
(iii) the level of CEO pay relative to other top executives at the same bank (the CEO pay slice), and (iv) the value of 
CEO risk-taking incentives. This confirms our argument that Advising Quality is not associated with the monitoring 
of the CEO. In contrast, consistent with Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014), we find that Monitoring Quality is 
significantly related to CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and various CEO compensation policies. The results 
are available upon request. 
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2.4.2 Control variables  
Estimating the bivariate model requires two sets of control variables, one set designed to explain 
the commission of misconduct and the other for detection of misconduct. The variables are 
chosen based on the existing theoretical and empirical work in the corporate fraud literature 
(Khanna et al., 2015; Wang, 2013; Wang et al., 2010).  
 
Commission of misconduct regressions 
Our baseline specification for the latent equation for banks committing misconduct is as follows:  
                              Mit* = XM, it M + XMD, it M + it                                                                              (8) 
 
XM, it contains a set of variables that previous studies have shown to influence a bank’s 
incentives to commit wrongdoing but not the likelihood that the wrongdoing is detected. XMD, it 
contains a set of factors that affect the bank’s incentives to commit wrongdoing and also the 
likelihood of detection.   
XM, it includes the bank’s profitability, leverage and investor beliefs about industry 
prospects. CEOs of poorly performing or financially distressed banks could be more likely to 
commit wrongdoing to inflate earnings. We control for bank profitability using the ratio of 
earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets (ROA) and leverage using the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets. In addition, Wang et al. (2010) show that misconduct is related to 
investor beliefs about industry prospects and find a non-linear relation with industry charter 
value. Hence, we include Industry charter value and (Industry charter value)2 in the misconduct 
commission equation. Industry charter value is measured as the median charter value in a given 
year.   
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XMD, it contains other bank-level measures such as size, risk, growth prospects, board-level 
monitoring proxies and CEO characteristics. We control for bank size using the natural logarithm 
of the book value of total assets. Furthermore, Povel et al. (2007) argue that CEOs of high-
growth firms that exhibit a downturn are more likely to commit wrongdoing. Thus, we control 
for the bank’s charter value using the ratio of market value of equity divided by the book value 
of equity (Charter value) and the percentage of change in bank assets over the prior year (Asset 
growth). The corporate fraud literature also suggests that a firm’s risk could be related to a firm’s 
tendency to commit wrongdoing. Thus, we control for a bank’s portfolio risk using the ratio of 
risk-weighted assets to total assets.  
Board characteristics: We control for various board monitoring proxies, such as the 
number of directors on the board (Board size) and the fraction of independent directors (Board 
independence). We also include the ratio of independent directors with prior experience as a 
CFO or a finance director (Board financial expertise). The monitoring role by independent 
directors has been widely documented in the fraud literature (e.g., Beasley, 1996). Furthermore, 
directors with relevant expertise could offer timely advice to the CEO and could therefore play 
an important advising role (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005).  
Further, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) suggest another reason for directors’ aversion to 
monitoring is because their career is tied to the CEO. Hence, we control for directors’ career 
concerns to demonstrate that the results based on our measure of monitoring quality are not 
driven by directors’ career concerns. We proxy for career concerns using the average age of 
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directors on the board (Ln(Board age)) since career concerns should be stronger when a worker 
is further away from retirement (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992).9  
Finally, for better-connected directors to be able to lever their network to access better 
information and be better advisors to the CEO, board networks should be “good” in the sense 
that they should not involve connections to firms engaged in misconduct. Otherwise, board 
connections could be used to foster rather than to prevent misconduct. To control for the quality 
of director networks, we compute the aggregate connections that board members have to firms 
that were involved in a misconduct case in the past 10 years. We call the resulting variable 
Exposure to misconduct.10   
CEO characteristics: Our controls for CEO characteristics include the number of years 
the CEO has served in this position (Ln(CEO tenure)) and whether the CEO also chairs the board 
(CEO is chair). We control for CEO tenure throughout the paper to demonstrate that the results 
based on our measure of monitoring quality are not driven by CEO tenure. We control for CEO 
is chair as CEOs who chair the board may block the information flow to board members and 
hence reduce the quality of board oversight (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
CEO pay: A number of papers link fraud to the compensation of executives (e.g. Johnson 
et al., 2009). CEOs may be incentivized to commit wrongdoing to manipulate short-term 
                                                          
9 For robustness, we use two alternative measures of career concerns in addition to board age and report the results 
in the Internet Appendix.  
10 We use a database of accounting fraud cases, namely, the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
(AAERs) to identify misconduct amongst financials and non-financial firms. The database provides detailed 
information on more than 1,300 cases of accounting misconduct involving banks and non-financials between 1982 
and 2013. In robustness tests (Internet Appendix), we use cartel cases as an alternative measure of misconduct and 
report qualitatively similar results. 
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performance to enjoy higher payouts. We control for the bonus component of CEO pay, 
measured as CEO bonus divided by total compensation. We also control for the equity incentives 
embedded in CEO compensation. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to bank risk (vega) measures 
the changes of CEO wealth to stock return volatility. If misconduct increases equity risk, this 
means that CEOs with higher vega will have an incentive to engage in riskier projects, including 
those involving wrongdoing. By contrast, the sensitivity of CEO wealth to bank performance 
(delta) measures changes in CEO wealth to stock price performance. Because delta exposes a 
CEO’s wealth also to falling stock prices, a higher delta might discourage CEOs from 
committing wrongdoing. Since CEOs will be interested in the relative impact of both vega and 
delta on their wealth before deciding to commit wrongdoing, we scale vega by delta (CEO 
vega/delta).11  
Top executive characteristics: Bank wrongdoing could directly relate to a range of 
observable characteristics of top executives. We compute the fraction of top 5 executives with a 
degree from an Ivy League institution (% Ivy League executives), an MBA degree (% MBA 
degree), or military experience (% Military executives). Chidambaran et al. (2012) show that 
CEOs attending an Ivy League university are less likely to commit fraud. Benmelech and 
Frydman (2015) argue that military-trained CEOs tend to have more conservative corporate 
policies and ethical principles. Hence, we infer from the findings that military-trained executives 
are less likely to commit wrongdoing.  
                                                          
11 We are grateful to Jeffery Coles, Naveen Daniel and Lalitha Naveen for sharing their data on CEO equity-based 
incentives online. Please refer to Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) and Core and Guay (2002) for detailed 
calculation of the variables. 
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Regulators: We control for the main regulator that supervises the bank. We include two 
dummies: OCC (equals 1 if the bank is overseen by the OCC) and FRB (equals 1 if the bank is 
overseen by the FRB).  
 
Detection of misconduct regressions 
                                    Dit* = XMD, it D + XD, it D + it                                                                              (9) 
As illustrated above, the vector XMD, it contains variables that influence both misconduct 
commission and detection processes.  
However, certain factors trigger the detection of misconduct while unrelated to the causes 
of banks committing misconduct. This is true for factors that cannot be anticipated by the CEO at 
the time when misconduct is committed. For example, a sudden drop in performance is difficult 
to predict for CEOs, but this performance drop may trigger additional regulatory scrutiny of 
banks and thus contribute to misconduct being detected. We identify a vector XD, it which 
includes variables that affect detection but are exogenous to a bank’s ex ante incentives to 
commit wrongdoing. Following Wang (2013), we include Abnormal ROA, Adverse stock return, 
Abnormal return volatility and Abnormal stock turnover in this vector.  
  [Table II around here] 
To capture Abnormal ROA performance relative to recent past performance, we compute 
the residuals (it) from the following model for each bank: ROA it = β0 + β1ROAit-1 + β2ROAit-2 + 
it. Adverse stock return is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank’s stock return is in the 
bottom 10% of all the bank-year return observations in the CRSP database. In addition, the 
bank’s stock return volatility and stock turnover could also trigger detection by regulators. We 
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measure Abnormal return volatility as the demeaned standard deviation of daily stock returns in 
a given year and Abnormal stock turnover as the demeaned daily stock turnover in a given year. 
Finally, we include year dummies in all regression specifications in the paper to control 
for the general economic environment. Table II provides summary statistics for the variables that 
we use in our analysis. 
 
3.   Bank Boards and Bank Misconduct 
3.1 MAIN RESULTS   
Table III reports our bivariate probit estimation regression results. Odd-numbered columns report 
prediction results for banks committing misconduct [P(M=1)]; even-numbered columns show the 
prediction results for banks that were detected to have committed misconduct, conditional upon 
misconduct having been committed [P(D=1|M=1)].  
[Table III around here] 
The coefficients of our key variables of interest, Monitoring Quality and Advising 
Quality, are statistically significant. Effective board monitoring and advising are associated with 
fewer cases of committed misconduct and more cases of detected misconduct. The results are 
economically significant. The estimated coefficient of Monitoring Quality suggests that a bank 
with all directors appointed before the CEO taking office (Monitoring Quality = 1) has a 27% 
lower probability of wrongdoing commission and a 35% higher probability of detection than a 
bank with no director appointed before the CEO taking office (Monitoring Quality = 0). A one-
standard-deviation increase in Advising Quality is associated with 11% lower probability of 
wrongdoing and 7% higher probability of detection.  
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The control variables have the expected signs. Most interestingly, board independence 
does not enter significantly. This indicates that the current standard for director independence, 
which mostly focuses on the absence of economic ties between directors and a firm, fails to 
prevent misconduct. We also find that banks with greater exposure to firms that have engaged in 
misconduct have a higher likelihood of committing misconduct and a lower likelihood of 
misconduct detection. This confirms that network quality plays an important role in preventing 
misconduct. Further, powerful CEOs, as proxied by CEO is chair, are less likely to be detected 
and are associated with a higher probability of committing misconduct. Surprisingly, we find that 
younger boards are associated with fewer misconduct cases. This could be because younger 
boards are more concerned about reputational damage (and diminished opportunities for new 
employment) if they gain a reputation as ineffective monitors. 
The variables excluded from the detection equation but included in the commission 
equation (Abnormal ROA, Adverse stock return and Abnormal stock volatility) show the 
expected signs and are statistically significant. An F-test of joint significance of Abnormal ROA, 
Adverse stock return, Abnormal stock volatility and Abnormal stock turnover (F-stats = 62.81; 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.000) indicates that they are jointly significant. Likewise, the variables excluded 
from the commission equation are also individually and jointly significant.  
Section 6 presents numerous robustness tests which show that our results are robust  
using a standard probit regression, the pre-2008 period only, board monitoring and advising by 
independent directors only, as well as various alternative tests. 
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3.2 CEO CHARACTERISTICS AND BANK MISCONDUCT  
An alternative explanation for the results we report above could be that CEOs with certain 
characteristics, such as greater talent or industry experience, may be more attracted to work for 
more connected boards. Thus, the lower misconduct likelihood associated with effective board 
advising could be due to CEO characteristics rather than board advising. This section shows that 
our main results remain robust to the inclusion of variables that measure CEO pay, shareholder 
ownership, education and military background.  
[Table IV around here] 
The first two columns of Table IV report the estimates between CEO pay and misconduct 
commission and detection, respectively. We find that CEO Bonus/total compensation and CEO 
vega/delta are positively related to the probability that misconduct is committed. The positive 
link between CEO bonus payment and wrongdoing is consistent with our argument that CEOs 
commit wrongdoing in order to boost stock prices and enjoy higher payouts.    
Columns (3) and (4) control for the personal characteristics of top executives. We find 
that executives attending elite universities (% Ivy League Executives) are less likely to commit 
wrongdoing which is consistent with these executives having greater skills and abilities. 
Alternatively, they could have greater concerns for their career and reputation (Chidambaran et 
al., 2012).  Executives with an MBA degree or military training have no effect on wrongdoing.  
 
3.3 RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT CLASSES OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
While we find that effective boards reduce wrongdoing, it is unclear whether this reduction holds 
for different types of misconduct. For instance, effective board advising could be particularly 
relevant in reducing technical types of misconduct where advising via the board will be 
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particularly important to inform CEO decision-making. To verify this, we classify enforcement 
actions according to how technical the underlying violation is. We examine the newspaper 
coverage and the websites of bank supervisory authorities to gather information on the exact 
violation(s) that have given rise to an enforcement action. We classify misconduct cases as 
technical if the enforcement action has been caused by violations of requirements concerning 
capital adequacy and liquidity, asset quality, lending, provisions and reserves. We classify 
misconduct cases as non-technical if the enforcement actions are related to failures of a bank’s 
internal control and audit systems, risk management systems, and anti-money laundering 
systems. Non-technical misconduct cases also include breaches of the requirements concerning 
the competency of the senior management team and the board of directors as well as violations 
of various laws such as consumer compliance programs, Federal Trade Commission Act 
(FTCA), Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). 12 Panel A of Table V shows the summary 
statistics of the two enforcement action types.  
[Table V around here] 
Consistent with our expectation, Panel B of Table V shows that Advising Quality reduces 
technical types of misconduct (such as violations of capital requirements or substandard asset 
quality) but has no measurable effect on non-technical types of misconduct. This reaffirms that 
our measure of board advising is different from board monitoring. Thus, consistent with previous 
literature (Coles et al., 2012; Field et al., 2013), our results indicate that board advising matters 
                                                          
12 While we cannot rule out that certain technical and non-technical types of misconduct could be functional to each 
other, we can demonstrate that these two types of misconduct capture largely unrelated types of behavior. We find 
the correlation between the two types to be 0.02 (not statistically significant). To further ensure that our results are 
not driven by cases in which both types of enforcement actions occur, we exclude banks that receive both types of 
enforcement actions during our sample period. The results of this untabulated test do not alter our main findings.  
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more when the demand for director advice is high. On the other hand, Monitoring Quality 
matters to both types of misconduct.    
We show that board advising matters most to misconduct of a technical nature. We take 
the analysis further by narrowing down the definition of the Advising Quality proxy and re-
estimate this relation. Our baseline definition of Advising Quality is the number of directors to 
whom the directors on the board are collectively connected, scaled by the size of the board. This 
assumes that every director has equal knowledge regardless of the industry in which the director 
is working. However, it is possible that a director serving on the board of a firm in an industry 
related to banking has better access to information and will be in a better position to offer 
relevant advice to the CEO. Furthermore, the director is likely to encounter similar technical 
issues confronting the board, such as setting the level of capital requirements. Hence, we 
construct a new measure of board advising: Industry Connections. This is defined as the 
connections that arise only from serving on boards in the following industries: insurance, 
investment companies, life assurance and private equity.13 Our second measure of advising is 
Large Firm Connections, which is based on the connections arising from serving on boards of 
large firms, where large means total assets above the sample median. Directors who serve on the 
board of a large firm have to deal with a wide range of issues facing the board and therefore 
could be able to offer better advice to the CEO (Coles et al., 2012).  
Panel C reports the estimated relations between alternative proxies of board advising and 
technical-related misconduct. For comparison purposes, columns (1) and (2) report our baseline 
results using the original definition of Advising Quality while Columns (3) and (4) report the 
                                                          
13 BoardEx has a variable called “Sector” which classifies firms into different industry sectors. The analysis shown 
in this test relies on the BoardEx definition of industry sector.  
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results using Industry Connections and (5) and (6) report Large Firm Connections. All 
coefficients are statistically significant. Most interestingly, Columns (1) and (3) reveal that the 
magnitude of Industry Connections is twice as large as that of our baseline measure (the 
difference is statistically significant). The results indicate that directors whose connections arise 
from firms in a related industry are able to offer high-quality advice to the CEO, providing 
further support to our hypothesis that board advising matters to misconduct.    
Overall, our findings demonstrate that boards with higher advising capacity could assist 
the CEO in making more accurate and better-informed decisions, thereby decreasing instances of 
wrongdoing.   
 
3.4 ENDOGENEITY OF BOARD MEASURES 
Identifying causality between our two board measures and bank misconduct poses some 
challenges. In particular, banks of a certain board composition could either attract or select CEOs 
who are more likely to commit misconduct. It is possible, for instance, that CEOs intent on 
committing misconduct choose to work for banks with ineffective boards. Further, while we 
control for a range of board and CEO characteristics, it is still possible that unobservable firm 
characteristics affect both director selection and the occurrence of misconduct at the same time. 
For instance, a bank’s corporate culture may be such that it makes misconduct more likely and 
may also attract a certain type of CEO who is more likely to engage in misconduct. 
To circumvent these endogeneity concerns, we exploit the role of the local labor market 
in supplying directors to a bank. Specifically, we construct two instrumental variables (IVs) that 
are related to Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality but are not related to misconduct. The 
first instrument is the distance from a bank’s headquarters to the nearest airport (Ln(Distance 
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Airport)). Geographic coordinates are obtained from the US Census file. The second instrument 
is the population of the county of the bank’s headquarters (Ln(Population)). County information 
is obtained through COMPUSTAT and the population information comes from the US Census 
Bureau. 
Both instruments are related to Monitoring Quality because they both affect the rate of 
director turnover. Arguably, directors are likely to eschew remotely located banks, that is, banks 
headquartered further away from an airport, in favor of more conveniently located banks. We 
would therefore expect higher director turnover in remote bank locations as directors leave these 
banks for more conveniently located institutions. Higher director turnover results in more 
director appointments and thus in lower Monitoring Quality at remotely located banks. Equally, 
both instruments affect Advising Quality because banks in locations with better access to an 
airport and banks located in more populous areas should have access to a larger labor market. 
Since the supply of qualified directors is limited and their recruitment is time-consuming 
(Knyazeva et al., 2013), more convenient bank locations will make it more likely that banks are 
able to recruit qualified directors with high advising capabilities. Advising Quality should thus be 
higher for more conveniently located banks.  
Importantly, neither the distance to the next airport nor the population of the county of a 
bank’s headquarters should be related to bank misconduct other than through the effect the 
instruments have on board composition. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporate Improvement 
Act of 1991 (FDICIA) puts in place the basis for a consistent intensity of enforcement across the 
US by requiring that each bank be examined by federal regulators as least once every 12 
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months.14 In addition, our data confirm that the enforcement intensity does not vary between 
urban and rural areas.15 
[Table VI around here] 
The first-stage estimation results are reported in Table VI, columns (1), (2), (5) and (6). 
Specifications (1) and (5) are for the commission equation while specifications (2) and (6) are for 
the detection equation. We run two first-stage regressions for Monitoring Quality and Advising 
Quality. As expected, Monitoring Quality decreases with the distance from a bank’s headquarters 
to the nearest airport and Advising Quality increases with the county’s population.  
The second-stage regression results are reported in specifications (3), (4), (7) and (8). The 
coefficients on our IV estimates are statistically significant and larger than those of OLS 
estimates. A potential explanation for this difference is that not accounting for endogeneity 
would bias the coefficients of Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality in OLS toward zero 
(Theil, 1971). This problem can be mitigated by the instrumental variable approach. Overall, we 
interpret these results as showing that our measures of board quality are causally related to 
misconduct in banking.  
                                                          
14 Some banks may qualify for a lower supervision frequency of 18 months if it is safe and sound and its total assets 
are below $500 million. This should not be a concern because there are less than 10% of banks in our sample falls 
into this category.   
15 As in Degryse and Ongena (2005), we define counties as urban if the population is more than 250,000 and as rural 
otherwise. We calculate enforcement intensity as the number of enforcement actions issued divided by the number of 
banks. The enforcement intensity is 0.38 and 0.33 for urban and rural areas, respectively and this difference is not 
statistically significant at customary levels. Under the assumption that misconduct is not location-related other than 
through the effect the instruments have on board composition, we interpret this as showing that enforcement 
intensity is uniform across the country.   
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4.    How Do Boards Reduce Enforcement Actions?   
In this section, we explore two specific channels through which boards can reduce bank 
misconduct cases. We examine whether boards that are more effective monitors and advisors 
could be associated with (i) lower bank risk or (ii) improved managerial discipline.  
4.1   REDUCTION IN BANK RISK 
Many cases of technical misconduct are issued when bank fundamentals indicate increased risk. 
Thus, effective boards could reduce technical misconduct by reducing a bank’s risk measures. 
We analyze three risk indicators: Tier-1 capital, portfolio risk and the fraction of non-performing 
loans. Tier-1 capital is a core measure of a bank’s financial strength from a regulatory point of 
view. Commercial banks exert discretion over the level of capital as long as it is above the 
minimum capital. In addition, we also examine portfolio risk and the fraction of non-performing 
loans as both are important causes of enforcement actions. Table VII reports the relation between 
Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality and measures of risk.  
[Table VII around here] 
After controlling for bank and other board characteristics, both Monitoring Quality and 
Advising Quality are positively related to Tier-1 capital. A one-standard-deviation increase in the 
percentage of non-captured board members and connected board members is associated with a 
21-basis-point and an 12-basis-point improvement in the bank’s Tier-1 capital, respectively. In 
addition, we find a negative relation between Monitoring Quality and the bank’s portfolio risk 
(as measured by the proportion of risk-weighted assets on a bank’s balance sheet) and the 
fraction of non-performing loans. Overall, the results in Table VII indicate that both board 
monitoring and board advising are associated with safer banks and, hence, reduce the instances 
of technical misconduct.  
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4.2 MANAGERIAL DISCIPLINE  
CEOs are likely to consider the personal costs of committing wrongdoing before they engage in 
it (Khanna et al., 2015). There are several ways in which the CEOs could be disciplined 
following the detection of misconduct. CEOs may lose their reputation and their job, and in some 
cases may face criminal charges (Karpoff et al., 2008b). Among these possible consequences, 
some are determined by the courts, some by the labor market and some by the board.  
One of the key monitoring functions of the board is to evaluate and discipline the CEO 
(Mace, 1971). We would expect that boards that are not captured by the CEO will impose 
heavier penalties on the CEO if wrongdoing is detected. We consider four ways in which boards 
could discipline CEOs: (1) dismissal, (2) reductions in pay, (3) reductions in pay relative to other 
top executives, and (4) reductions in contractual risk-taking incentives (CEO vega).16  These 
variables are measured one year after the enforcement action takes place.  
Table VIII reports the regressions of our board measures on measures of CEO discipline. 
Misconductt-1 is equal to 1 if wrongdoing is detected during the previous year. Misconduct relates 
detected wrongdoing to the CEO’s penalties via an interaction with Monitoring Quality. 
Therefore, the coefficient of the interaction term measures the penalties the CEO has to bear after 
wrongdoing is detected and when board monitoring is high.  
[Table VIII around here] 
Panel A of Table VIII displays our key estimation results. Odd-numbered columns omit 
the interaction terms while even-numbered columns display the full set of variables. As shown in 
                                                          
16  We are only interested in CEO vega but not CEO delta because vega gives the CEO a clear incentive to commit 
wrongdoing while delta has an ambiguous effect on wrongdoing. Thus, boards would be interested in modifying the 
vega component following wrongdoing discovery.   
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the odd-numbered columns, Misconduct is not significant in any specification. On average, a 
regulatory enforcement action does not lead to CEOs being disciplined. However, the interaction 
term between Misconduct and Monitoring Quality indicates that following misconduct under 
higher board monitoring quality, CEOs are disciplined in the following ways: CEOs receive (i) a 
larger pay cut, (ii) a reduced pay slice relative to other top executives at the same bank and (iii) 
lower contractual risk-taking incentives (CEO vega). It is interesting to note that our results on 
pay slice show that the reduction in CEO pay following misconduct is not due to executive pay 
having been reduced for all executives, but that CEO pay has been reduced relative to other 
executives. Evidently, boards view the CEO as the key person holding responsibility for 
misconduct and therefore reduce the CEO salary relative to the salaries of other executives.  
Panel B of Table VIII displays the results of tests that interact Misconduct with Advising 
Quality. Advising Quality should not have an effect on how CEOs get disciplined following 
misconduct. Consistent with this, none of the interaction terms enter the regression significantly. 
This validates our interpretation of Advising Quality capturing the ability of the board to give 
advice rather than to monitor the CEO.  
Our results have two key implications. First, non-captured directors discipline the CEO 
after wrongdoing is detected, thus increasing the CEO’s costs of wrongdoing. This could act as 
an ex ante deterrent to the CEO to engage in wrongdoing and could explain why our earlier 
analysis shows that effective board monitoring reduces the probability that banks engage in 
misconduct. Second, in the absence of a board that engages in effective monitoring, regulatory 
enforcement actions have little impact on CEOs being disciplined. These results add novel 
insights to the CEO’s disciplinary mechanisms in the banking sector (Schaeck et al., 2012). In 
banks, not only shareholders but regulators are also involved in monitoring and therefore play a 
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role in the CEO’s disciplinary process. Consistent with this, our results indicate that regulatory 
action alone does not discipline bank CEOs, but a combination of the two – effective board 
monitoring and enforcement action – can create the desired effects. 
 
5. Does Better Board Quality Alleviate Shareholder Wealth Losses?  
In the previous sections, we show how effective boards reduce the likelihood of bank 
misconduct. We now test whether effective boards also reduce the severity of misconduct. 
Consistent with the prior literature, we capture the severity of misconduct using the abnormal 
stock price reaction to the announcement of misconduct (e.g. Cumming et al., 2015).  
We expect to find a positive relationship between the announcement returns and 
measures of board monitoring and advising. Since high-quality boards are more effective at 
preventing misconduct, detected cases of misconduct are likely to be less severe. Assuming that 
the wrongdoing that is detected in t is likely to have been committed in t-1, we expect lagged 
board variables to be linked with higher announcement returns.17 Further, effective boards are 
more likely to take corrective action, such as disciplining the CEO and “fixing” the bank after 
wrongdoing has been detected. Thus, investors may be more positive about misconduct when the 
current board exhibits high monitoring or advising quality. Thus, we also include 
contemporaneous measures of monitoring and advising in our analysis. 
[Table IX around here] 
We use event study methodology to test these hypotheses. To find the announcement 
date, we search newspapers using the Factiva database and define the event day as the earliest 
                                                          
17 Our results are robust to alternative time gaps between the commission and detection of misconduct. We find 
qualitatively identical results if the gap is two or three years.  
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trading day when the news of the enforcement action is made public. We drop several 
observations where there are missing stock returns or when other major corporate news is 
released on the same day. This yields a sample of 206 announcements. We then estimate a 
market model using a value-weighted CRSP index as a market index from 46 to 146 days before 
the announcement of an enforcement action. We construct cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
as the sum of the prediction errors of the market model.  
 The average CARs over a three-day [-1, +1] event window is -3.50%, (significant 
difference at the 1% level). This shows that regulatory enforcement actions hurt shareholder 
wealth. The dependent variables are CARs of three-day window [-1, +1]. Table IX displays our 
regression results. Columns (1) and (2) show that the announcement returns are positively related 
to measures of Monitoring Quality when wrongdoing is committed (t-1) as well as when it is 
detected (t). The coefficients are also economically significant. CARs are on average 6% higher 
when the board has all directors appointed before the CEO’s tenure than when none are 
appointed before the current CEO’s tenure. Thus, effective board monitoring reduces the severity 
of the misconduct. Further, investors expect an effective board to take action to help the bank 
recover from the misconduct as shown by a significant coefficient on contemporaneous measures 
of Monitoring Quality. This lends support to our prior finding that following enforcement action, 
a board with effective monitoring capability will discipline the CEO. Finally, Columns (3) and 
(4) show that Advising Quality does not enter the regression significantly.  
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6. Internet Appendix: Robustness tests on the relation between board effectiveness and 
bank misconduct  
 
In this section, we test the robustness of our key results using alternative definitions of our board 
measures.  The results are included in an internet appendix to this paper. 
 
6.1 Is Monitoring Quality driven by CEO tenure?  
Monitoring Quality correlates with CEO tenure as longer-tenured CEOs will have been able to 
appoint a larger fraction of directors. Thus, our measure of monitoring quality may capture the 
effects associated with long CEO tenure instead of effective board monitoring. We show that our 
results are not affected by CEO tenure as follows. 
First, we control for CEO tenure in all specifications in the analysis above. Second, we 
compute Residual Monitoring Quality as the residual from a regression of Monitoring Quality on 
CEO tenure. This variable is free of any positive correlation between CEO tenure and 
Monitoring Quality. As indicated in the Internet Appendix A.I., our results are robust using our 
modified measure of Monitoring Quality that strips out the effect of tenure. 
 
6.2 Is Monitoring Quality driven by director experience?  
Another possibility is that our Monitoring Quality correlates with director tenure, and thus 
reflects the experience of directors. Directors who are not captured by the CEO tend to have 
longer board tenure. We use two different approaches to deal with this concern.   
First, we control for average board tenure. Second, as with CEO tenure, we estimate the 
residual from a regression of Monitoring Quality on average board tenure. Our results are robust 
to using this modified measure of monitoring as indicated in the Internet Appendix A.II.    
35 
 
6.3 Is Monitoring Quality capturing director’s career concerns?  
In the analysis above, we use board age to control for director career concerns. In this section, we 
use two alternative measures of career concerns and show that controlling for these does not alter 
our main findings.  
First, we include the fraction of board members who are younger than 65. Second, we 
include the fraction of board members whose current appointment at the bank is their first and 
only directorship. These directorships should be particularly valuable to directors thus raising 
their career concerns and turning them into more effective monitors. As shown in the Internet 
Appendix A.III., Monitoring Quality continues to enter significantly after controlling for these 
alternative proxies of directors’ career concerns.  
 
6.4 Is Advising Quality different from board busyness?  
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) define a board to be “busy” if more than half of the outside directors 
on a board hold three or more directorships. While a board does not need to be “busy” to have 
high Advising Quality, we could expect a positive correlation between these two measures. Thus, 
Advising Quality may capture the effects of a busy board instead of effective advising quality. 
We define Board busyness similar to Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and perform two tests to show 
that the effects we obtain for Advising Quality are not driven by Board busyness.   
As shown in the Internet Appendix A.IV., Board busyness does not explain bank 
misconduct. First, we include both Advising Quality and Board busyness in the bivariate probit 
model. The coefficients of Board busyness are insignificant in both the commission and 
detection equations while the coefficients of Advising Quality remain significant. Second, we 
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repeat the analysis by including only Board busyness but not Advising Quality. Again, none of 
the coefficients are significant.  
 
6.5 Alternative measure of the quality of director’s networks  
Our paper uses accounting fraud data to measure the quality of director networks. For robustness, 
we also use an alternative source of fraud data, the Private International Cartels Data Set 
(Connor, 2010).18 This dataset includes more than 2,115 companies involving in price-fixing 
cartels between 1998 and 2012. As shown in the Internet Appendix A.V., Advising Quality 
remains significant. Consistent with the argument that the fraudulent culture can be 
transmissible, we find that banks with more connections to cartelists are more likely to commit 
wrongdoing and are less likely to get detected.  
 
6.6 Using a standard probit model  
Our paper uses the bivariate probit model to show that effective boards reduce the probability of 
the CEO committing misconduct conditional upon detection of misconduct. For robustness, we 
also show the results of a simple standard probit model to examine the relationship between 
effective boards and the likelihood of a bank receiving an enforcement action in the Internet 
Appendix A.VI. Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality enter negatively and are statistically 
significant indicating that monitoring and advising are associated with fewer enforcement 
actions.  
 
 
 
                                                          
18 We thank John Connor for generously sharing the cartel data with us. 
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6.7 Alternative bivariate probit model specification 
In our baseline model, we have some excluded instruments in both the commission and detection 
equations. Some studies that use the bivariate model to study fraud have excluded instruments in 
one equation, say, fraud detection equation, but not the other (e.g. Khanna et al., 2015). To test if 
our bivariate model is sensitive to the model specification, we remove ROA, Leverage and 
Industry charter value from the fraud commission equation. The results are in the Internet 
Appendix A.VII.   
 
6.8 Are our results driven by the post-2007 period? 
Table I shows a surge in the number of enforcement actions issued after the 2007 financial crisis. 
This raises concerns that our results could be driven by the 2008 financial crisis. To address this 
concern, we split the sample into two groups: before and after the crisis. As shown in the Internet 
Appendix A.VIII., our results are not driven by the crisis.  
 
6.9 Independent directors  
Our definitions of Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality do not differentiate between 
directors who are independent and executives who sit on the board. One may argue that our 
results could be mostly driven by executives on the board who should feel most beholden to the 
CEO. To address this concern, we limit our analysis to independent directors and calculate the 
fraction of independent directors who are appointed before the CEO’s tenure (Monitoring 
Quality of Independent Directors) and the connections of independent directors (Advising 
Quality of Independent Directors).  
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As shown in the Internet Appendix A.IX., we find that all results obtained using 
independent directors are similar to those using all board members. This implies that independent 
directors can also be susceptible to monitoring quality and advising quality. Monitoring and 
advising quality among independent directors affects the likelihood of misconduct being 
committed and detected in the same way as for the complete board. An implication of this 
finding is that the share of independent directors that has been extensively studied in the 
literature as a key monitoring device does not sufficiently capture a board’s monitoring ability.   
  
7. Conclusions  
Trust in the banking sector is vital to the functioning of the financial system and for economic 
activity. Misconduct in banking undermines the general public’s confidence in the safety and 
soundness of the banking sector. Thus, studying the determinants of bank misconduct is an 
important topic of potentially wide implications.   
In this study, we focus on two key functions of bank boards, monitoring and advising, 
and find that both functions are effective in reducing the probability that banks receive 
enforcement actions from regulators. Further analyses reveal that while board monitoring 
reduces all categories of misconduct, board advising reduces misconduct of a more technical 
nature. The results are economically meaningful and robust to two-stage instrumental variable 
analysis. Overall, we identify three channels through which effective boards deter misconduct: 
effective boards increase the likelihood that misconduct is detected, they reduce bank risk and 
they increase the penalties imposed on the CEO following the discovery of misconduct. 
Furthermore, effective boards also mitigate the severity of misconduct.  
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Our study has important implications for policy makers. The Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (2014) in its recent regulatory guidelines establishes ‘heightened expectations’ of 
the role of bank boards in shaping a bank’s risk culture and in reducing misconduct cases. These 
views are echoed by the Financial Stability Board (2014) which places bank boards at the core of 
effective risk management and emphasizes their responsibility in monitoring and providing “sage 
advice” to senior management. The findings we report in this paper confirm that boards play an 
important role in the risk management of banks and that the ‘heightened expectations’ of boards 
in preventing misconduct are justified.  
Finally, our paper offers novel insights on how to structure bank boards to prevent 
misconduct. First, our study shows that in addition to monitoring, directors also give advice to 
the CEO and this plays an important role in preventing misconduct. Thus, the advisory function 
of boards deserves more attention as part of the governance process. Second, we show that 
conventional board measures such as board independence and financial expertise have no 
measurable effect on bank misconduct being committed or detected. By contrast, the board 
metrics we study in this paper related to monitoring and advising are important predictors of 
misconduct. Overall, our study illustrates that board governance matters in banking. Our findings 
demonstrate that governance metrics revolving around CEO connections warrant more attention 
from regulators, investors and governance activists.  
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Table I. Time distribution of banks receiving enforcement actions 
 
This table reports the number of regulatory enforcement actions in our sample over the period of 2000-2013. We also display the 
number of enforcement actions in our sample in terms of all enforcement actions issued against listed US banks and the total 
assets of banks receiving enforcement actions in our sample as a percentage of the total assets of all listed US banks that receive 
enforcement actions each year. 
 
Year # Enforcement actions 
in our sample 
% All enforcement actions  
against listed banks  
% Total assets of listed banks  
with enforcement actions 
    
2000 5 55.56% 98.48% 
2001 5 41.67% 84.34% 
2002 3 37.50% 65.24% 
2003 7 70.00% 96.61% 
2004 12 80.00% 99.01% 
2005 5 50.00% 92.77% 
2006 6 66.67% 99.24% 
2007 2 50.00% 99.67% 
2008 10 62.50% 98.62% 
2009 48 82.76% 93.49% 
2010 59 88.06% 95.18% 
2011 39 90.70% 99.60% 
2012 28 90.32% 99.85% 
2013 15 83.33% 99.82% 
 
TOTAL 244 78.71% 94.42% 
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Table II. Descriptive statistics 
 
Definitions of all variables are included in Appendix I. For each variable, the p-value of the difference between banks with 
misconduct and without misconduct are calculated. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.    
 
       Misconduct? 
 N Mean Median Std. p.1 p.99 Yes No 
Key governance measures        
Monitoring Quality 4072 0.544 0.545 0.314 0.000 1.000 0.462 0.548*** 
Advising Quality 4072 1.815 0.000 3.802 0.000 18.263 1.788 2.338** 
         
Bank-specific characteristics       
ROA (%) 4072 0.580 0.857 1.278 -5.226 2.197 -0.572 0.639*** 
Leverage 4072 0.906 0.909 0.029 0.815 0.966 0.918 0.905*** 
Industry charter value 4072 1.503 1.312 0.613 0.787 2.591 1.169 1.169*** 
Ln(Assets) 4072 21.692 21.328 1.699 19.090 27.298 22.067 21.673*** 
Asset growth 4072 0.102 0.066 0.190 -0.172 0.789 0.037 0.106*** 
Portfolio risk 4072 0.728 0.739 0.142 0.314 1.023 0.740 0.727 
Charter value 4072 1.503 1.384 0.924 0.139 4.366 1.070 1.526*** 
Loans 4072 0.666 0.685 0.143 0.135 0.904 0.673 0.666 
Non-performing loans 4072 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.036 0.005 0.002*** 
Tier-1 capital 4072 0.089 0.086 0.023 0.041 0.161 0.081 0.089 
Stock returns 4072 0.010 0.020 0.117 -0.361 0.273 -0.056 0.013*** 
         
Corporate governance measures       
Board size 4072 11.598 11.000 3.528 6.000 23.000 11.035 11.626** 
Board independence 4072 0.765 0.800 0.138 0.364 0.933 0.772 0.765 
Board financial expertise 4072 0.040 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.333 0.050 0.040* 
Exposure to misconduct 4072 0.147 0.000 0.569 0.000 3.000 0.172 0.146 
Ln (Board age) 4072 4.125 4.126 0.064 3.957 4.288 4.136 4.125** 
Institutional ownership 1196 0.243 0.239 0.122 0.017 0.552 0.247 0.242 
         
CEO characteristics and incentives      
Ln (CEO tenure) 4072 1.916 1.988 0.793 0.095 3.395 2.053 1.909** 
CEO is chair 4072 0.490 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.485 0.490 
CEO vega/delta 887 0.389 0.286 0.286 0.000 1.623 0.503 0.381** 
CEO bonus/total compensation 1273 0.130 0.035 0.166 0.000 0.623 0.122 0.131 
CEO ownership 1273 0.028 0.008 0.069 0.000 0.434 0.050 0.027*** 
CEO dismissal 4072 0.091 0.000 0.288 0.000 1.000 0.111 0.090 
Ln(CEO total pay) 1273 7.740 7.585 1.151 5.757 10.593 7.954 7.725* 
CEO pay slice 1196 0.376 0.364 0.109 0.124 0.742 0.376 0.376 
CEO vega 887 221.473 53.111 412.213 0.000 1908.120 239.649 220.281 
         
Top-5 characteristics       
% Ivy League executives 1196 0.125 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.600 0.135 0.125 
% MBA executives 1196 0.294 0.200 0.256 0.000 1.000 0.329 0.292 
% Military executives 1196 0.058 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.600 0.044 0.059 
         
Detection of misconduct         
Abnormal ROA 3018 0.000 0.217 1.164 -4.864 2.302 -0.960 0.055*** 
Adverse stock return 3018 0.045 0.000 0.207 0.000 1.000 0.197 0.037*** 
Abnormal stock volatility 3018 0.000 -0.009 0.063 -0.124 0.219 0.043 -0.002*** 
Abnormal stock turnover 3018 0.000 -0.024 0.740 -1.765 2.484 0.282 -0.014*** 
         
Instrumental variables         
Ln(Distance airport) 4072 2.539 2.485 0.778 0.531 4.329 2.480 2.418 
Ln(Population) 4072 0.771 1.000 0.420 0.000 1.000 0.798 0.769 
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Table III. Bivariate probit model estimation for board effectiveness and bank misconduct 
 
Columns (1) and (3) report the estimated relations between Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality and the commission of 
misconduct (M=1), and Columns (2) and (4) report the relations between Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality and detection, 
given misconduct (D=1|M=1). Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The sample covers the period 1999–2012. 
Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix I. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.    
 
  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Monitoring Quality -1.180*** 2.187**   
 (-3.212) (2.044)   
Advising Quality   -0.131*** 0.087*** 
   (-3.839) (3.360) 
ROA -0.003  0.203**  
 (-0.058)  (2.264)  
Leverage 9.440***  10.789**  
 (2.925)  (2.386)  
Industry Charter Value -4.923***  -10.326***  
 (-3.111)  (-4.205)  
(Industry Charter Value)2 1.594***  3.191***  
 (3.014)  (3.650)  
Ln(Assets) -0.108 0.873*** 0.234*** 0.097* 
 (-1.254) (3.890) (3.066) (1.815) 
Asset growth -0.224 -2.528* -0.020 -1.555*** 
 (-0.347) (-1.793) (-0.038) (-3.917) 
Portfolio risk 1.259* -0.321 0.803 0.819 
 (1.955) (-0.208) (0.907) (1.169) 
Charter value -0.305*** 0.372 -0.354*** 0.044 
 (-2.968) (1.535) (-3.679) (0.532) 
Loans -1.872** 5.728** 1.016 -0.270 
 (-2.255) (2.490) (1.364) (-0.408) 
Non-performing loans 10.526 -26.039* 18.607 -12.635** 
 (0.976) (-1.766) (1.550) (-2.479) 
Tier-1 capital -2.253 11.234 -6.645 -0.574 
 (-0.541) (1.075) (-1.338) (-0.189) 
Board size 0.038 -0.204*** -0.018 -0.031 
 (1.437) (-2.594) (-0.310) (-1.452) 
Board independence 0.241 -0.297 -1.107 0.360 
 (0.372) (-0.185) (-0.643) (0.594) 
Board financial expertise 0.900 -2.084 0.606 -0.025 
 (1.315) (-1.232) (0.685) (-0.043) 
Exposure to misconduct 0.391** -1.209*** 0.318* -0.347*** 
 (2.115) (-3.453) (1.851) (-3.200) 
Ln (Board age) 3.243*** -2.876 -0.215 2.255** 
 (2.951) (-0.849) (-0.140) (2.504) 
Ln (CEO tenure) -0.133 0.335 0.414*** 0.048 
 (-1.023) (1.048) (4.067) (0.619) 
CEO is chair 0.510*** -1.610** 0.910*** -0.314*** 
 (2.942) (-2.546) (3.729) (-2.709) 
Abnormal ROA  -0.574***  -0.359*** 
  (-2.925)  (-5.499) 
Adverse stock return  0.584  0.559*** 
  (1.189)  (3.062) 
Abnormal stock volatility  3.544*  3.761*** 
  (1.725)  (3.644) 
Abnormal stock turnover   -0.128  -0.091 
  (-0.790)  (-1.474) 
Observations 3004 3004 3004 3004 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -497 -497 -491 -491 
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Table IV. Board effectiveness and bank misconduct: CEO characteristics 
 
Columns (1) and (3) report the estimated relations between CEO characteristics and the commission of misconduct (M=1), and 
Columns (2) and (4) report the relations between CEO characteristics and detection, given misconduct (D=1|M=1). Monitoring 
Quality and Advising Quality and detection, given misconduct (D=1|M=1). Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The 
sample covers the period 1999–2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix I. t-Statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.    
 
 
  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Monitoring Quality  -3.453*** 2.120** -1.480*** 2.331** 
 (-4.050) (2.236) (-3.035) (2.291) 
Advising Quality  -0.348*** 0.350*** -0.128*** 0.762*** 
 (-3.315) (3.948) (-3.921) (4.574) 
CEO vega/delta 1.426*** 0.412   
 (4.039) (1.587)   
CEO bonus/total compensation 2.162** 1.343   
 (2.051) (1.470)   
CEO ownership  -1.656 4.805***   
 (-0.774) (2.956)   
% Ivy League executives   -1.570*** 10.033*** 
   (-2.781) (5.350) 
% MBA executives   0.257 1.245* 
   (0.728) (1.645) 
% Military executives   0.182 -2.122 
   (0.212) (-1.602) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations  722 722 945 945 
Log likelihood  -117 -117 -176 -176 
Prob > Chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table V. Board effectiveness and bank misconduct: Split-sample tests 
 
Panel A displays the summary statistics of the two enforcement actions types. In both Panels B and C, odd-numbered columns report the estimated 
relations between Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality and the commission of misconduct (M=1), and even-numbered columns report the 
relations between Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality and detection, given misconduct (D=1|M=1). Panel B splits the enforcement actions 
sample into technical enforcement actions and non-technical enforcement actions. Panel C uses alternative proxies of board advising and re-estimate 
the relations between Advising Quality and the likelihood of Technical enforcement actions. Columns (1) and (2) report our estimation using the 
baseline definition of Advising Quality, measured as the number of directors to whom directors on the board are collectively connected, scaled by 
board size. Columns (3) and (4) report our estimation using Industry Connections, which imposes the additional restriction that connected directors 
should sit on the board of financial services firms. Columns (5) and (6) report our estimation using Large Firm Connections, which includes the 
requirement that a connected director should sit on the board of large firms. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The sample covers the 
period 1999–2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix I. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Summary statistics on regulatory enforcement actions split by degree of technicality  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    N 
i. Technical Enforcement Actions                                                                                                                                                             147 
Enforcement actions taken for violations of capital adequacy and liquidity, asset quality, lending, provisions and reserves. 
 
ii. Non-technical enforcement Actions                                                                                                                                                        97 
Enforcement actions related to failures of the bank’s internal control and audit systems, risk management systems, and anti-
money laundering systems. This also includes breaches of the requirements concerning the competency of the senior 
management team and the board of directors as well as violations of various laws such as consumer compliance programs, 
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). 
 
Panel B: By types of regulatory enforcement actions       
 P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1)  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 Technical   Non-technical   
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                   
Monitoring Quality  -1.165*** 4.308**    -0.782** 1.255**   
 (-3.174) (2.510)    (-2.341) (2.501)   
Advising Quality    -0.074** 0.338***    -0.037 0.477 
   (-2.156) (3.011)    (-1.601) (1.146) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations  3004 3004 3004 3004  3004 3004 3004 3004 
Log likelihood  -251 -251 -251 -251  -256 -256 -208 -208 
Prob > Chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
          
Panel C: Alternative proxies of Advising Quality and Technical Enforcement Actions 
 P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1)  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1)  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 All connections  Industry connections  Large firm connections 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
                
Advising Quality  -0.074** 0.338***  -0.191*** 0.411***  -0.135*** 0.377** 
 (-2.156) (3.011)  (2.821) (3.073)  (-2.671) (2.332) 
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  3004 3004  3004 3004  3004 3004 
Log likelihood  -251 -251  -300 -300  -261 -261 
Prob > Chi2  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
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Table VI. Instrumental variable regressions for board effectiveness and bank wrongdoing 
 
This table reports the instrumental variable (IV) regression results. The endogenous variables are Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality. 
The instrumental variables are Ln(Distance Airport), the natural logarithm of the distance from the bank’s headquarters to the nearest 
airport and Ln(Population), the natural logarithm of the population of the county of the bank’s headquarters. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) 
report the first-stage estimation results while Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) report the second-stage results. The sample covers the period 
1999–2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix I. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.    
 
 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
 Monitoring Quality P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) Advising  Quality P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Ln(Distance airport) -0.016*** -0.020***   0.005 0.020   
 (-4.353) (-4.724)   (0.157) (0.544)   
Ln(Population)                    -0.011*** -0.011***   0.144*** 0.163***   
 (-4.262) (-3.984)   (5.926) (5.354)   
Fitted Monitoring Quality  -17.619*** 48.254***     
   (-4.805) (6.282)     
Fitted Advising Quality      -0.596*** 0.492*** 
      (-5.057) (2.781) 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4072 3004 3004 3004 4072 3004 3004 3004 
R-Squared                               0.648 0.652   0.673 0.682   
Log likelihood  -463 -463   -350 -350 
Prob>Chi2   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
F-statistics (IVs)                 10.147          10.764   11.018 11.453   
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Table VII. Board quality and bank’s accounting measures of risk 
 
This table estimates the impact of board monitoring and advising quality on various measures of risk. The dependent variables 
are Tier-1 capital ratio, bank’s portfolio risk and the fraction of non-performing loans. All models include year dummies and 
bank-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The sample covers the period 1999–2012. Definitions of all 
variables are provided in Appendix I. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively.    
 
  Tier-1 capital  Portfolio risk  Non-performing loans  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Monitoring Quality 0.006**  -0.029***  -0.004***  
 (2.263)  (-3.082)  (-4.025)  
Advising Quality  0.0004**  0.0002  -0.000 
  (2.019)  (0.146)  (-0.401) 
ROA 0.000 0.000 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 (0.818) (0.883) (5.906) (5.922) (-3.748) (-2.091) 
Leverage -0.340*** -0.341*** 0.725*** 0.720*** 0.021** 0.021* 
 (-11.920) (-11.840) (2.860) (2.832) (2.051) (1.877) 
Ln(Assets) -0.002 -0.003* -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.480) (-1.671) (-0.398) (-0.360) (-1.122) (-0.809) 
Asset growth -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
 (-3.086) (-3.202) (-0.267) (-0.246) (0.523) (0.574) 
Portfolio risk 0.026** 0.026** - - 0.004 0.005 
 (2.374) (2.321) - - (1.636) (0.741) 
Charter value 0.001* 0.001* -0.005 -0.005 0.000* 0.000 
 (1.713) (1.710) (-1.251) (-1.240) (1.745) (1.264) 
Loans 0.007 0.007 0.520*** 0.522*** -0.007** -0.007 
 (0.739) (0.803) (9.800) (9.855) (-2.456) (-1.071) 
Non-performing loans 0.084* 0.081* 0.577** 0.599* - - 
 (1.959) (1.838) (1.961) (1.956) - - 
Tier-1 capital - - 0.659* 0.642* -0.001 -0.003 
 - - (1.950) (1.895) (-0.104) (-0.211) 
Board size  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-0.658) (-1.262) (0.307) (0.993) (-3.205) (-2.956) 
Board independence 0.008* 0.006 -0.008 -0.002 -0.005** -0.004 
 (1.755) (1.419) (-0.414) (-0.132) (-2.556) (-1.564) 
Board financial expertise 0.014** 0.013** 0.029 0.032 0.004 0.004 
 (2.075) (1.983) (0.733) (0.799) (1.228) (0.556) 
Exposure to misconduct 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.280) (-0.571) (0.138) (0.075) (1.260) (1.329) 
Ln (Board age) 0.007 0.015 -0.037 -0.073* -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.590) (1.531) (-0.889) (-1.808) (-0.155) (-0.908) 
Ln (CEO tenure) 0.000 -0.002*** -0.006* 0.003 -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.122) (-2.847) (-1.732) (1.357) (-3.244) (-0.072) 
CEO is chair -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.002** 
 (-0.257) (-0.230) (-0.018) (-0.013) (-4.058) (-2.350) 
Bank-fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3519 3519 3519 3519 3519 3519 
R-Squared 0.672 0.671 0.821 0.820 0.524 0.522 
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Table VIII. Board quality and CEO’s anticipated costs of misconduct 
 
This table estimates the impact of board monitoring and advising quality on a CEO’s penalties following an enforcement action. 
The dependent variables are an indicator of CEO dismissal, Ln(CEO total pay), the level of CEO pay relative to other top 
executives at the same bank (CEO pay slice) and CEO pay-risk sensitivity (vega). All models include year dummies and bank-
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The sample covers the period 1999–2012. Definitions of all variables 
are provided in Appendix I. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively.    
 
Panel A: Monitoring quality and CEO’s anticipated costs of misconduct 
 CEO dismissal CEO pay CEO pay slice CEO vega 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Monitoring Quality  0.095  -0.478**  -0.117**  -0.113* 
* Misconduct  (0.611)  (-2.335)  (-2.437)  (-1.798) 
Misconduct 0.014 -0.035 0.061 0.308** 0.017 0.015 -0.013 0.048 
 (0.275) (-0.401) (0.634) (1.998) (0.699) (0.479) (-0.267) (0.725) 
Monitoring Quality -0.067 -0.075 -0.004 0.037 0.005 0.078* 0.036 0.046 
 (-0.877) (-0.995) (-0.021) (0.200) (0.171) (1.797) (0.562) (0.817) 
ROA -0.025 -0.025 0.029 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 (-1.528) (-1.526) (0.934) (0.930) (0.123) (0.129) (0.172) (0.255) 
Leverage 0.832 0.818 0.304** 0.311** -0.072 -0.055 -0.466 -0.460 
 (1.489) (1.466) (2.417) (2.456) (-0.427) (-0.327) (-1.045) (-1.024) 
Ln(Assets) -0.054 -0.055 - - 0.002 0.004 0.029 0.031 
 (-0.995) (-1.021) - - (0.103) (0.182) (0.504) (0.544) 
Charter value -0.058** -0.059** 0.123*** 0.129*** 0.007 0.009 0.050 0.052 
 (-2.116) (-2.112) (2.857) (3.006) (0.939) (1.101) (1.397) (1.436) 
Board size 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.543) (1.532) (0.179) (0.200) (-0.620) (-0.579) (-0.206) (-0.149) 
Board independence -0.319* -0.319* -0.706** -0.708** 0.003 0.003 0.100 0.098 
 (-1.959) (-1.967) (-2.250) (-2.247) (0.061) (0.059) (0.502) (0.493) 
Board financial expertise 0.062 0.061 0.272 0.278 0.054 0.056 -0.261 -0.259 
 (0.266) (0.260) (0.594) (0.600) (0.606) (0.621) (-1.302) (-1.293) 
Exposure to misconduct -0.368 -0.360 -1.095 -1.132 -0.235 -0.245 -0.140 -0.143 
 (-0.737) (-0.722) (-1.118) (-1.135) (-1.280) (-1.304) (-0.575) (-0.583) 
Ln (Board age) 0.005 0.005 0.034 0.032 0.010 0.010 0.050* 0.050* 
 (0.202) (0.221) (0.909) (0.854) (1.652) (1.593) (1.721) (1.705) 
Ln (CEO tenure) 0.024*** 0.024*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.005* 0.005* 
 (4.387) (4.359) (-0.325) (-0.369) (-0.240) (-0.295) (1.667) (1.699) 
CEO is chair 0.022 0.024 0.087 0.080 -0.005 -0.006 - - 
 (0.447) (0.470) (1.005) (0.933) (-0.334) (-0.446) - - 
CEO ownership -0.642*** -0.649*** -0.332 -0.292 -0.200 -0.191 -0.028 -0.029 
 (-2.630) (-2.645) (-0.481) (-0.429) (-1.469) (-1.425) (-0.638) (-0.674) 
Stock returns -0.025 -0.029 0.154 0.596 0.002 0.007 -0.030 -0.026 
 (-0.145) (-0.167) (0.658) (0.780) (0.050) (0.178) (-0.276) (-0.238) 
Institutional ownership -0.195 -0.188 0.816* 0.777 0.093 0.084 0.079 0.074 
 (-0.960) (-0.929) (1.709) (1.623) (1.142) (1.044) (0.441) (0.413) 
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 944 944 944 944 944 944 738 738 
R-Squared 0.247 0.248 0.855 0.856 0.465 0.472 0.786 0.787 
Panel B: Advising Quality and CEO’s anticipated costs of misconduct 
 CEO dismissal CEO pay CEO pay slice CEO vega 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Advising Quality -0.012 0.001 0.003 0.014 
*Misconduct (-1.607) (0.038) (0.455) (1.084) 
Misconduct 0.056 0.051 0.006 -0.045 
 (0.841) (0.404) (0.211) (-0.932) 
Advising Quality 0.005 -0.009 0.001 0.013 
 (0.854) (-0.569) (0.219) (1.231) 
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Table IX. Do effective boards alleviate shareholder wealth losses when misconduct becomes public? 
 
This table reports the multivariate regression analyses of stock market reactions to the announcements of banks receiving an 
enforcement action. The dependent variables of all models are CARs for a three-day window [-1, +1] (%). All models include 
year dummies. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix I. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.    
 
 CARs [-1, +1] % 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Monitoring Qualityt-1  6.237**    
 (2.127)    
Monitoring Quality t  5.927**   
  (2.507)   
Advising Qualityt-1   -0.134  
   (-0.786)  
Advising Quality t    -0.145 
    (-0.752) 
ROA 0.626* 0.491 0.595 0.621* 
 (1.713) (1.365) (1.639) (1.701) 
Leverage -10.245 -15.323 -10.124 -13.629 
 (-0.330) (-0.502) (-0.328) (-0.435) 
Ln(Assets) -0.109 0.061 -0.097 0.130 
 (-0.260) (0.146) (-0.233) (0.251) 
Asset growth -3.055 -2.795 -3.341 -2.746 
 (-0.530) (-0.493) (-0.577) (-0.477) 
Portfolio risk 0.734 1.313 0.678 0.819 
 (0.083) (0.151) (0.077) (0.093) 
Charter value 0.363 0.492 0.280 0.340 
 (0.563) (0.775) (0.434) (0.530) 
Loans -4.683 -3.531 -3.890 -4.137 
 (-0.587) (-0.450) (-0.488) (-0.520) 
Non-performing loans 6.167 14.100 4.250 8.097 
 (0.175) (0.406) (0.121) (0.229) 
Tier-1 capital -0.997 -6.661 -2.642 -4.411 
 (-0.030) (-0.204) (-0.079) (-0.131) 
Board size  0.458** 0.379* 0.449** 0.447** 
 (2.113) (1.759) (2.051) (2.037) 
Board independence 5.802 3.956 5.092 5.574 
 (1.112) (0.766) (0.975) (1.067) 
Board financial expertise 2.837 3.257 2.416 2.414 
 (0.455) (0.531) (0.388) (0.387) 
Exposure to misconduct -0.670 -0.398 -0.033 -0.734 
 (-0.655) (-0.395) (-0.025) (-0.719) 
Ln (Board age) 10.751 10.903 12.208 12.077 
 (1.123) (1.159) (1.268) (1.256) 
Ln (CEO tenure) -0.419 0.993 -0.079 -0.078 
 (-0.651) (1.175) (-1.045) (-1.031) 
CEO is chair 0.785 0.302 1.025 1.001 
 (0.560) (0.217) (0.722) (0.705) 
Constant -41.393 -46.007 -47.340 -48.467 
 (-0.780) (-0.884) (-0.896) (-0.915) 
Observations 206 206 206 206 
R-squared 0.216 0.225 0.197 0.193 
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Appendix I. Definition of variables 
 
Variable  Definition Source 
Key governance measures 
Monitoring Quality The fraction of board members who are appointed before the  CEO takes 
office 
BoardEx 
Advising Quality The number of directors to whom board members on the board are 
collectively connected, scaled by board size 
BoardEx 
Residual Monitoring Quality The residual from a regression of Monitoring Quality on Ln(CEO tenure) BoardEx 
Board-tenure adjusted monitoring 
quality 
The residual from a regression of Monitoring Quality on Ln(Board tenure) BoardEx 
Monitoring Quality of independent 
directors 
The fraction of independent directors who are appointed before the current 
CEO. 
BoardEx 
Advising Quality of independent 
directors  
The number of directors to whom independent directors on the board are 
collectively connected, scaled by the total number of independent directors 
sitting on the board. 
BoardEx 
 
Bank-specific characteristics   
ROA (%) Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by book value of total 
assets (BHCK2170) 
CRSP,           
FR Y9-C 
Leverage Book value of liabilities divided by book value of total assets FR Y-9C 
Industry charter value The median charter value in a given year  FR Y-9C 
Ln(Assets) Natural logarithm of total assets (BHCK2170) FR Y-9C 
Asset growth The percentage of change in total assets relative to prior year FR Y-9C 
Portfolio risk Ratio of risk-weighted assets (BHCKA223) divided by total assets FR Y-9C 
Charter value Market value of equity divided by book value of equity CRSP,         
FR Y9-C 
Loans Ratio of total loans (BHCK2122) divided by total assets FR Y-9C 
Non-performing loans Ratio of loans past due day 90 days or more (BHCK5525) and nonaccrual 
loans (BHCK5526) divided by total assets  
FR Y-9C 
Tier-1 capital Ratio of Tier-1 capital (BHCK8274) divided by total assets  FR Y-9C 
Stock returns  Annual buy-and-hold stock returns CRSP 
   
Corporate governance measures   
Board size The number of directors sitting on the board BoardEx 
Board independence The fraction of non-executive directors on the board BoardEx 
Board financial expertise The fraction of independent directors with prior experience working as a 
CFO or finance director   
BoardEx 
Exposure to misconduct The aggregate connections board members have with firms that involved in a 
misconduct case committed within the past 10 years 
AAERs  
Exposure to cartel networks The aggregate connections board members have with firms that involved in a 
price-fixing cartel discovered within the past 10 years 
Private 
International 
Cartels  
Ln (Board age) Natural logarithm of the average age of board members  BoardEx 
Ln (Board tenure) Natural logarithm of the average tenure of board members  BoardEx 
Age <65 The fraction of board members whose age is below 65 BoardEx 
First and only directorship The fraction of board members whose current appointment at the bank is 
their first and only directorship.  
BoardEx 
Board busyness Dummy equals 1 if the majority of board members hold three or more 
directorships and 0 otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Institutional ownership The fraction of shares held by investment companies and independent 
investment advisors  
Thomson 
One Banker 
   
CEO characteristics and incentives   
Ln (CEO tenure) Natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has served in this position BoardEx 
CEO is chair  Dummy that equals 1 if CEO is also the chairperson  BoardEx 
CEO bonus/total compensation CEO bonus divided by CEO total pay ExecuComp 
CEO ownership The fraction of shares owned by the CEO  ExecuComp 
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CEO dismissal We follow Khanna, Kim, and Lu (2015) to identify CEO dismissal. If the 
press reports the CEO turnover as “fired”, “forced out”, “dismissed”, 
“resigned following a period of bad performance” or “resigned due to policy 
differences” it is classified as forced. We classify all departures of CEOs who 
are older than 60 as voluntary. We classify departures of CEOs who are 
younger than 60 as “dismissed” if the press does not report the reason as 
“poor health”, “death”, or “acceptance of another position”; or if the article 
reports the CEO is retiring, but does not announce the succession plan at 
least six months before the new CEO takes office.       
Factiva 
Ln(CEO total pay) The natural logarithm of CEO total pay ExecuComp 
CEO pay slice The fraction of top five executives’ pay captured by the CEO  ExecuComp 
CEO vega Sensitivity of CEO compensation to share price, expressed in $'1000 ExecuComp 
CEO delta Sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock return volatility, expressed in 
$'1000 
ExecuComp 
   
Characteristics of top five executives   
% Ivy League executives The fraction of top five executives with an Ivy League education  BoardEx 
% MBA executives The fraction of top five executives with an MBA degree  BoardEx 
% Military executives The fraction of top five executives with prior military experience BoardEx 
   
Detection of misconduct   
Abnormal ROA Residual from the regression: ROAt = 0 + 1ROAt-1 + 2ROAt-2 +  CRSP 
Adverse stock return Dummy equals 1 if stock return is below -20% (or in the bottom 10% of all 
stocks in CRSP bank sample)  
CRSP 
Abnormal stock volatility The demeaned standard deviation of daily stock volatility in a year CRSP 
Abnormal stock turnover  The demeaned average daily stock turnover in a year CRSP 
   
Instrumental variables   
Ln(Distance airport) Natural logarithm of the distance from the bank’s headquarters to the nearest 
airport 
US Census 
file 
Ln(Population) Natural logarithm of the population of the county of the bank’s headquarters US Census 
Bureau 
   
Types of Enforcement Actions   
Technical misconduct Enforcement actions taken for violations of capital adequacy and liquidity, 
asset quality, lending, provisions and reserves.  
SNL 
Financial, 
Factiva 
Non-technical misconduct Enforcement actions related to failures of the bank’s internal control and 
audit systems, risk management systems, and anti-money laundering 
systems. This also includes breaches of the requirements concerning the 
competency of the senior management team and the board of directors as 
well as violations of various laws such as consumer compliance programs, 
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), Equal Credit Opportunities Act 
(ECOA) etc. 
SNL 
Financial, 
Factiva 
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Table A.I. Is Monitoring Quality driven by CEO tenure? 
 
Residual Monitoring Quality is the residual from a regression of Monitoring Quality on Ln(CEO tenure). Column (1) reports 
the estimated relations between Residual Monitoring Quality and the commission of misconduct (M=1), and Column (2) 
reports the relations between Residual Monitoring Quality and detection, given misconduct (D=1|M=1). Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level. The sample covers the period 1999–2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix I. 
t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.    
 
  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 (1) (2) 
Residual Monitoring Quality -1.162*** 2.154** 
 (-3.194) (2.016) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
Observations 3004 3004 
Log likelihood  -497 -497 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 
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Table A.II. Does Monitoring Quality capture director experience? 
 
Ln(Board tenure) is the natural logarithm of the average tenure of board members. Panel A reports the results when Monitoring 
Quality and Ln(Board tenure) are both included in the model. Panel B reports the residual regression results. Board-tenure 
adjusted monitoring quality is the residual from a regression of Monitoring Quality on Ln(Board tenure). Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level. The sample covers the period 1999–2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Controlling for average board tenure   
  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 (1) (2) 
Monitoring Quality -1.244*** 2.478** 
 (-3.292) (2.129) 
Ln (Board tenure) 0.017 -0.035 
 (0.784) (-0.530) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
Observations 3004 3004 
Log likelihood  -497 -497 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 
   
Panel B: Residual regression    
  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 (1) (2) 
Board-tenure adjusted monitoring quality -2.143*** 0.440* 
 (-6.267) (1.845) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
Observations 3004 3004 
Log likelihood  -497 -497 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 
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Table A.III. Is Monitoring Quality capturing director’s career concerns? 
 
This table controls for alternative measures of director’s career concerns. Age<65 is the fraction of board members whose age 
is below 65. First and only directorship is the fraction of board members whose current appointment at the bank is their first 
and only directorship. Panel A reports the results when Monitoring Quality and Age<65 are both included in the model. Panel 
B reports the results when Monitoring Quality and First and only directorship are both included in the model. Standard errors 
are clustered at the bank level. The sample covers the period 1999–2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 
1. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Panel A: % of board members <65   
 P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 (1) (2) 
Monitoring Quality  -1.170*** 2.242** 
 (-3.183) (2.092) 
Age <65 -0.108 0.975 
 (-0.175) (0.564) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
Observations 3004 3004 
Log likelihood  -497 -497 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 
   
Panel B: % first and only directorship  
  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 (1) (2) 
Monitoring Quality -0.961*** 1.708* 
 (-2.901) (1.714) 
First and only directorship  0.277 -0.599 
 (0.703) (-0.570) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
Observations 3004 3004 
Log likelihood  -497 -497 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 
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Table A.IV. Does Advising Quality capture Board busyness? 
Board busyness is a dummy that equals 1 when the majority of board members hold three or more directorships and 0 
otherwise. Panel A reports the results when Advising Quality and Board busyness are both included in the analysis. Panel B 
reports the results when only Board busyness is included. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The sample covers 
the period 1999–2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 1. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.    
 
Panel A: Advising Quality and Board busyness are included  
  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 (1) (2) 
Advising Quality -0.065** 0.966*** 
 (-2.496) (3.391) 
Board busyness 0.162 -1.354 
 (0.430) (-0.119) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
Observations 1019 1019 
Log likelihood  -177 -177 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 
   
Panel B: Only Board busyness is included   
  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 (1) (2) 
Board busyness 0.091 -0.542 
 (0.137) (-0.247) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
Observations 945 945 
Log likelihood  -195 -195 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 
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Table A.V. Alternative measure of director network quality 
 
This table uses an alternative source of fraud data for the quality director’s network. We use the Private International Cartels 
Data Set (Connor, 2010), provided by John Connor, which includes more than 2,115 companies involving in price-fixing 
cartels. Exposure to Cartel Networks is the number of connections that board members of a given bank have with firms that 
used to be involved in a price-fixing cartel. The sample covers the period 1999–2012. Definitions of all variables are provided 
in Appendix 1. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively.    
 
  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 (1) (2) 
Advising Quality -0.059** 0.123*** 
 (-2.056) (3.549) 
Exposure to Cartel Networks 0.148* -0.302** 
 (1.693) (-2.367) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
Observations 3004 3004 
Log likelihood  -497 -497 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 
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Table A.VI. Probit model estimation for board effectiveness and bank misconduct 
 
This table reports standard probit model estimation results. The dependent variable equals 1 if an enforcement action is issued 
during the year. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The sample covers the period 1999–2012. Definitions of all 
variables are provided in Appendix 1. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10% level, respectively.    
 
  
Probit 
P(M=1) 
Probit 
P(M=1) 
Probit 
P(M=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Monitoring Quality -0.468**  -0.476** 
 (-2.409)  (-2.448) 
Advising Quality  -0.034* -0.035* 
  (-1.665) (-1.706) 
ROA -0.136*** -0.139*** -0.139*** 
 (-4.871) (-4.975) (-4.982) 
Leverage 4.886** 4.984** 4.766** 
 (2.522) (2.570) (2.470) 
Ln(Assets)  0.242*** 0.279*** 0.296*** 
 (3.004) (3.378) (3.564) 
Asset growth -0.567* -0.541* -0.563* 
 (-1.869) (-1.746) (-1.844) 
Portfolio risk 0.643 0.616 0.818 
 (1.230) (1.139) (1.558) 
Charter value -0.132 -0.129 -0.132 
 (-1.558) (-1.473) (-1.549) 
Loans -0.173 -0.200 -0.313 
 (-0.354) (-0.403) (-0.641) 
Non-performing loans 6.917 8.065 6.971 
 (1.273) (1.440) (1.282) 
Tier-1 Capital -1.058 -0.982 -1.197 
 (-0.413) (-0.375) (-0.470) 
Board size -0.030** -0.063 -0.030** 
 (-2.082) (-0.206) (-2.074) 
Board independence -0.151 0.155 -0.118 
 (-0.492) (0.328) (-0.378) 
Board financial expertise -0.116 1.421* -0.096 
 (-0.238) (1.922) (-0.198) 
Exposure to misconduct -0.131 0.149 -0.082 
 (-1.353) (1.407) (-0.768) 
Ln (Board age) 1.570** 0.018*** 1.581** 
 (2.166) (3.298) (2.182) 
Ln (CEO tenure) 0.004 -0.059 0.003 
 (0.435) (-0.704) (0.297) 
CEO is chair -0.053 0.376*** -0.043 
 (-0.622) (3.802) (-0.511) 
Observations 4066 4066 4066 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -682 -687 -680 
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Table A.VII. Alternative specification of bivariate probit model 
 
Columns (1) and (3) report the estimated relations between Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality and the commission of 
misconduct (M=1), and Columns (2) and (4) report the relations between Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality and 
detection, given misconduct (D=1|M=1). Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  The sample covers the period 1999–
2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 1. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.    
 
  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Monitoring Quality -1.150** 1.373**   
 (-2.208) (2.085)   
Advising Quality   -0.094*** 0.092*** 
   (-4.003) (4.159) 
Ln(Assets) -0.207** 0.422*** 0.084 0.147*** 
 (-2.329) (3.524) (1.353) (3.056) 
Asset growth -0.198 -0.772 0.914 -1.738*** 
 (-0.203) (-0.640) (1.394) (-4.053) 
Portfolio risk 0.665 -0.390 0.537 0.955* 
 (0.753) (-0.348) (0.907) (1.765) 
Charter value -0.351*** 0.342** -0.381*** -0.040 
 (-3.226) (2.385) (-5.865) (-0.569) 
Loans -1.648 2.446* -0.440 0.066 
 (-1.471) (1.808) (-0.653) (0.124) 
Non-performing loans 16.012 -24.116 37.403*** -12.232** 
 (1.366) (-1.624) (4.395) (-2.109) 
Tier-1 capital -8.192* 8.493 -12.299*** 0.398 
 (-1.913) (1.322) (-4.448) (0.155) 
Board size 0.034 -0.074 -0.032 -0.030* 
 (0.974) (-1.514) (-1.471) (-1.824) 
Board independence 0.282 -0.354 1.020* -0.252 
 (0.257) (-0.239) (1.824) (-0.580) 
Board financial expertise 0.701 -1.055 0.577 -0.195 
 (0.777) (-0.876) (0.735) (-0.348) 
Exposure to misconduct 2.022 -1.422 0.220 2.092*** 
 (1.284) (-0.666) (0.212) (2.612) 
Ln (Board age) 0.534** -0.792*** 0.467*** -0.453*** 
 (2.442) (-2.999) (3.166) (-3.835) 
Ln (CEO tenure) -0.076 0.117 0.516*** -0.009 
 (-0.419) (0.491) (5.544) (-0.141) 
CEO is chair 0.522** -0.783*** 0.349*** -0.191* 
 (2.324) (-2.739) (2.860) (-1.777) 
Abnormal ROA  -0.193**  -0.333*** 
  (-2.258)  (-6.926) 
Adverse stock return  0.249  0.315* 
  (1.508)  (1.909) 
Abnormal stock volatility  1.845**  4.030*** 
  (2.175)  (5.204) 
Abnormal stock turnover   -0.053  -0.130** 
  (-0.911)  (-2.087) 
Observations 3004 3004 3004 3004 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -513 -513 -505 -505 
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Table A.VIII. Are our results driven by the 2008 crisis? 
 
Odd-numbered columns report the estimated relations between Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality and the commission of misconduct (M=1), 
and even-numbered columns report the relations between Monitoring Quality and Advising Quality and detection, given misconduct (D=1|M=1). 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The sample covers the period 1999–2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 1. t-
Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.    
 P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1)  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 1999–2007   2008–2012  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                   
Monitoring Quality  -1.042* 1.293*    -0.367* 5.278***   
 (-1.828) (1.754)    (1.753) (-4.440)   
Advising Quality    -0.175*** 0.900***    -0.094*** 0.127*** 
   (-2.936) (3.664)    (-2.792) (4.309) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations  1416 1416 1416 1416  1588 1588 1588 1588 
Log likelihood  -109 -109 -95 -95  -349 -349 -348 -348 
Prob > Chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table A.IX. Monitoring and Advising Quality for independent directors 
 
Monitoring Quality of independent directors is the fraction of independent directors who are appointed before the current 
CEO. Advising Quality of independent directors is the number of directors to whom independent directors on the board are 
collectively connected, scaled by the total number of independent directors sitting on the board. Columns (1) and (3) report 
the estimated relations between Monitoring Quality of independent directors and Advising Quality of independent directors 
and the commission of misconduct (M=1), and Columns (2) and (4) report the relations between Monitoring Quality of 
independent directors and Advising Quality of independent directors and detection, given misconduct (D=1|M=1). Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level. The sample covers the period 1999–2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in 
Appendix 1. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.    
 
  P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) P(M=1) P(D=1|M=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Monitoring Quality of independent directors -0.913*** 2.119*   
 (-2.964) (1.802)   
Advising Quality of independent directors   -0.118*** 0.080*** 
   (-4.306) (3.573) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3004 3004 3004 3004 
Log likelihood  -497 -497 -491 -491 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
